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BOOK REVIEW
example, take the New York rule for unlimited damages for death
by wrongful act, and the rule elsewhere for a limit of $5,000 or
$10,000; by observation it may some day be possible to compare the
different results of these two rules as to, say, careful operation of
industries, fraud in trials, family welfare, etc., etc. Certainly, we
oVght not to be satisfied to argue finally for or against either of these
rules without knowing how they work in their results. Certainly
also, we should proceed to make those observations, exactly and fully,
But this method of judgment is not the only one; moreover, it is not
yet feasible, even for such a common rule of law; and, finally, we
must also settle our ethical standards for valuing the data when we
do get them. And so on for hundreds of other examples. Let the
movement go on. It is a remarkable enlargement of the scope of
legal thought, and a needed example of the scientific possibilities
in nomology. But let this movement not be taken as involving the
discard of what we have gained to date.
However, I1 Diritto Sperimentale does not descend to concrete
aspects of experimental law, like the above example. Rather, it sur-
veys first the cosmos of legal ideas, and clears the ground for think-
ers in the practical field. Chapter I deals generally with the experi-
mental method as applied to the science of law, and herein refers to
the possibility of using statistical measurements. Chapter II analyzes
the concept of law. Chapters III and IV explain the author's dis-
tinction between heterogeneous and homogeneous uniformity, 'uni-
formity' here being used of behavior, and the text going fully into
the behavioristic aspects of law. Chapter V studies the "constitu-
tion of uniformity," i. e., the various modes in which uniformity of
behavior is secured. Chapter VI deals with the evolution and trans-
formation of uniformity (by the principles of equality, liberty,
revolution, progress, etc.) Chapter VII examines the idea of jus-
tice. And Chapter VIII closes with "the possibility of practical
applications of the experimental method in the study of law." It
was here, alas! that we expected to find concrete guidance for test-
ing in the practical manner above suggested. But we recommend
this chapter to all who expect to tread the experimental path. It will
perhaps open larger and deeper vistas of speculation than heretofore.
We note only that as the author cites (p. 237) the Journal of Crim-
inal Law and Criminology for 1919, he is probably more progressive
in his reading than many professors of criminal law in American
law schools.
JOHN H. WIGMAORE.
LA CONSCRIPTION DES NEUTRES DANS LES LUTTES DE LA CONCUR-
RENCE, ECONOMIQUE. By Mohamed Abdullah EI-Araby.
Paris: Marcel Giard. Pp. xxx + 328.
This volume is the latest addition to the growing list of the
publications of the Institute of Comparative Law established at
Lyons through the efforts of Professor Edouard Lambert. It under-
takes to present a study of the English law of today, with regard to
the legality of pressure brought to bear on persons not parties to an
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industrial or economic dispute to induce them in turn to exercise
a desired pressure on the adverse party-more specifically the sec-
ondary boycott as a trade weapon. The discussion is centered about
the recent case of Sorrell v. Smith, which was decided in the Chan-
cery Division on March 28, 1923.1 To state its facts very briefly,
Sorrell, a retail newspaper dealer, had purchased his papers from R.,
a wholesaler, but decided to do so from W. thereafter. Thereupon
the defendants, a committee of newspaper directors, notified W. that
if he continued to sell papers to the plaintiff, Sorrell, the defendants
would cease to furnish him with any of their publications. At the
same time Sorrell was informed that he must resume purchases from
R. While the purpose of the defendants is not made dear, it may
be guessed that they aimed at such a control over the retail dis-
tributers as would enable them to fix the number of distributers at
whatever they might find most desirable. The present proceedings
were by Sorrell, to secure an injunction against such an interference
with his freedom of purchase from whom he liked. Thus the case
raises once more those problems which were so far from settled
by Allen v. Flood2 and Quinn v. Leathemn. 3  Perhaps the instant
case is destined to reach equal heights of fame with these two, as it
has already passed through the Court of Appeal 4 and will probably
be carried to the House of Lords. The same conflict of views which
the two cases just named represent, has, of course, arisen in other
countries also, and the central purpose of M. EI-Araby's study is
to render available for continental European readers a general sur-
vey of the manner in which English judges have handled it. There
is, therefore, a description in great detail not only of Allen v. Flood
and Quinn v. Leathen, but also of Pratt v. British Medical Associa-
tion5 and Ware and De Fr~ville v. Motor Trade Association8 ; in-
deed, about eighty pages are given to a synopsis of their holdings,
for the benefit of readers who almost without exception will be
unable to gain access to the original reports. In the same way much
of the subsequent material represents an abridgement of the opinion
of Russell, J., in the case under consideration. To this extent nat-
urally M. EI-Araby's work fills no need of the average American
reader. In much less degree this is also true of his analysis of the
meaning of the various cases and the arguments used by the suc-
cessive judges. Their attempts to reconcile hopelessly divergent
decisions do not merely appear vain to him-a view he only shares
with Scrutton, L. J.,T-but utterly useless. No formula can be, or
should be, discoverable by which a mechanical jurisprudence is
enabled to obtain the solution of a problem by merely applying a
rule of thumb to it. Some have tried to crystallize this illegal ele-
1. L. R. (1923) 2 Ch. Div. 41.
2. (1898) A. C. 1.
3. (1901) A. C. 495.
4. (1924) 1 Ch. Div. 506.
5. (1919) 1 K. B. 244.
6. (1921) 3 K. B. 40.
7. "I have read these cases, some of them several times, and find it quite
impossible to harmonize them": Ware and de Fr&QIle v. Motor Trade Assn.,
supra note 6.
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ment, which poisons the entire situation, in the existence of a con-
spiracy, others in an intent to injure others rather than in a desire
to further one's own self interest. Some again have urged that there
is a freedom to work without any outside interference, while at
the opposite extreme others can see no possibility of a wrong where,
as they insist, there is simply a combination of means legal in them-
selves and an end which likewise is legal. The unsatisfactory state
of the English law, the mass of casuistry and complexity which the
courts have loaded on themselves, are all demonstrated forcefully.
The author concludes with a plea that the House of Lords should
do what it has frankly admitted to in the cases involving agreements
not to compete, that is, recognize that it is passing on a question of
public policy where one decision cannot furnish an absolute guide
for another but, at most, merely point the way. Doubtless, it would
promote clearer thinking and hence lead to more satisfactory results
if the mass of theorizing.and hair-splitting referred to by him could
be wiped away. To a large extent, however, the same questions
would remain, merely dressed in new garments. We would still
have to inquire as to the conclusions to be drawn from those magic
words, "public policy." M. El-Araby recognizes this but answers
that the solution would be much easier, as the searcher would
really know what he was" after by reason of such a realistic state-
ment of his task. He" makes no attempt to carry on the inquiry
into the practical considerations which actually are to control the
decision. With the exception of Mr. Williston's work on Contracts,
American scholarship receives scant attention. It is an especial pity
that no use has been made of Kales's monograph on "Contracts and
Combinations in Restraint of Trade." The latter study has per-
haps come nearer than any other, to success in the attempt to con-
struct a formula which would at once explain past cases and pro-
vide a guide to the policy to control future holdings. It would have
been interesting to see whether or not Mr. Kales's efforts seemed
to have more substance and meaning than those of others, in the eyes
of a critical and intelligent foreign observer.
E. W. PUTTKAMMER.
ARBITRATION TREATIES AMONG THE AMERICAN NATIONS TO THE
CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1910. Edited by William R. Manning.
Publications of the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, Division of International Law, Washington. New
York: Oxford University Press. 1924. Pp. xl + 472.
The editor of this volume, now with the Latin American Divi-
sion of the State Department, states that it is designed to include
"all arbitration treaties and all arbitral clauses of other treaties
which were signed between or among American nations before the
close of 1910 and duly ratified," but he clearly recognizes the diffi-
culty of guaranteeing its completeness. He includes not only gen-
eral arbitration treaties but the protocol or 'compromis' by which
specific claims have been submitted whether such documents are in
the form of treaty or executive agreement. Where the 'compromis'
